"It's Asia, Stupid": Time for the EU to Deepen Relations with Asia by Cameron, Fraser
www.ssoar.info
"It's Asia, Stupid": Time for the EU to Deepen
Relations with Asia
Cameron, Fraser
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Cameron, F. (2017). "It's Asia, Stupid": Time for the EU to Deepen Relations with Asia. (GIGA Focus Asien, 6).
Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien,
Institut für Asien-Studien. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-54741-7
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-ND Licence
(Attribution-NoDerivatives). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0
Focus | ASIA            
Fraser Cameron
“It’s Asia, Stupid”: Time for the EU to 
Deepen Relations with Asia 
GIGA Focus | Asia | Number 6 | November 2017 | ISSN 1862-359X
Global economic power is shifting rapidly to Asia, now the EU’s most im-
portant trade partner. The EU has a vital stake in the peace and security of 
Asia as few of its policy goals, including climate change and preservation of 
the multilateral system, can be achieved without the positive engagement 
of Asia. This is even more important because of the attitude of President 
Trump to Asia and global affairs. The EU thus needs to give greater priority 
to Asia and develop a more coherent policy approach.
 • Growth rates in Asia have outstripped those in the EU and US for many years. 
Projected economic growth of 5.5 per cent this year in the Asia-Pacific region is 
far ahead of the 2.1 per cent and 1.9 per cent projected in the US and the EU, re-
spectively. With economic clout comes political influence, which means that the 
EU has to pay more attention to Asia to achieve its own policy goals, whether in 
trade, climate change, migration, or terrorism.
 • The EU has to prioritise and should concentrate on its strategic partners (Chi-
na, Japan, India, and South Korea) and support for ASEAN. The withdrawal of 
the US from the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) offers the EU an opportunity. 
The policy of bilateral free trade agreements with selected partners should be 
continued as there is little prospect of any region-to-region agreement.
 • The EU has a major stake in Asian security as any conflict would immediately 
impact global supply chains. It should do more to tackle “hot spots,” such as the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Myanmar, and emphasise 
its integrated approach to security, as demonstrated in Operation Atalanta.
 • The EU should not give up its normative agenda but should promote it in a 
more sensitive and realistic manner. The EU could also do more to help resolve 
the historical disputes in Asia, including paying more attention to its own his-
torical role in the region. 
Policy Implications
With the multilateral system under threat from the Trump presidency, the EU needs 
to engage more with Asia to secure its policy goals. It should revitalise its strategic 
partnerships as the centrepiece of a new Asia strategy. At the Asia–Europe Meet-
ing (ASEM) summit in Brussels in 2018, the EU should highlight its commitment to 
a stronger partnership with Asia. While trade will still be at the centre of EU–Asia 
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Limited Success
The EU has been slow to recognise the importance of the rise of Asia and has strug-
gled to make an impact as a political actor in Asia. In 2001 it agreed an ambitious 
goal of “strengthening the EU’s political and economic presence across the region, 
and raising this to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an en-
larged EU” (European Commission 2001). This was complemented by further policy 
papers dealing with China, India, Southeast Asia, and East Asia (Council of the Eu-
ropean Union 2012). The European Security Strategy of December 2003, how ever, 
made scant reference to Asia but suggested that the EU should develop strategic 
partnerships with China, India, and Japan. More than a decade later, in 2016, the 
EU agreed a new global strategy which gave far more attention to Asia, stating that 
there was “a direct connection between European prosperity and Asian security.” It 
mostly focused on deepening trade and investment with China but also stated that 
it was ready “to make a greater practical contribution to Asian security” (European 
Union n.d.).
After 15 years, one can conclude that the EU has only had limited success in 
achieving its 2001 goal. In Asia the EU is viewed primarily as an important trad-
ing partner and supplier of development and humanitarian assistance. The EU has 
found it difficult to achieve a coherent and united approach to Asia, especially to-
wards China, which is adept at playing divide and rule with the EU’s 28 member 
states. There are, however, signs of a change in attitude on both sides. It is increas-
ingly clear that the EU and its member states understand the growing importance 
of Asia in the global system and are willing to deepen relations. The recent opening 
of an EU delegation in Mongolia is evidence of this trend.
For Asia, the EU is its biggest trade partner and largest provider of technical, 
development, and humanitarian assistance. There are large and growing research 
and tourism links. The new buzz word is “connectivity” – a central theme for ASEM, 
the Belt and Road Initiative, and EU–ASEAN relations (Schüller and Schüler-Zhou 
2015). In addition, and partly in response to changes in Washington, the EU is now 
looking to Asia for a partner that can help to secure global security and stability, 
open markets, and the rule of law. It wants Asian support for a global and regional 
order that is based on international law, agreed rules, and strong institutions and 
networks rather than on “spheres of influence” or “historical rights.” 
There is growing evidence that this EU approach is finding resonance. Many 
Asian countries joined the EU in condemning the Russian annexation of Crimea in 
2014 and also welcomed the EU’s support for a peaceful resolution of disputes in 
the South China Sea. A number of Asian countries are participating either fully in 
or in parallel to the EU-led anti-piracy Operation Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden. To 
the surprise of many, the EU has been invited for the first time to attend the East 
Asia Summit, which will take place in November 2017. One of the main motives 
for the invitation was that the EU is now regarded as a beacon of stability and pre-
dictability compared to the instability and uncertainty brought about by President 
Trump’s arrival in the White House. The president has questioned US alliances in 
Asia, has pulled the US out of the TPP (and the Asia-supported Paris climate change 
agreement), and has threatened “to destroy” the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (DPRK). All these moves have given added urgency for the EU to have its own 
strategy towards Asia. 
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Why Asia Matters
Asia has recently surpassed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
to become Europe’s main trading partner, accounting for over 40 per cent of Eu-
rope’s total trade flows. Moreover, European foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Asia amounts to a third of European investment abroad and is growing. Asian in-
vestment into the EU, especially from China, is also significant and growing. Over 
50 per cent of global growth in recent years has come from China, whose economy 
has become so big that it could well be as influential in the twenty-first century as 
US capitalism was in the twentieth century. Other Asian countries also continue to 
outperform the EU. Projected economic growth of 5.5 per cent this year in the Asia-
Pacific region far outstrips the 2.1 per cent and 1.9 per cent predicted in the US and 
eurozone, respectively. The level of economic interdependence between the EU and 
Asia has reached a very high level and is critical for the future growth prospects of 
both sides (European Union 2016). 
As the US retreats into an “America First” strategy and withdraws from the 
TPP, it is timely that the EU seizes the trade initiative. The EU has already conclud-
ed free trade agreements (FTAs) with South Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam, while 
the far-reaching FTA with Japan is almost completed. The negotiations with India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Malaysia are either ongoing or waiting to 
be resumed when political conditions change. President Juncker has called for the 
imminent FTA negotiations with Australia and New Zealand to be completed within 
a year. The ultimate goal is an EU–ASEAN FTA; however, given the large economic 
differences between the countries of Southeast Asia, it will be some years before 
serious talks start. In the meantime, negotiations are underway between the EU and 
ASEAN for an open skies aviation agreement.
It is important to remember that for all the excitement of “Asian miracles,” 
Asia still contains millions of people living in poverty. With its belief that trade can 
reduce poverty, the EU has granted most developing countries in Asia trade prefer-
ences under the generalised system of preferences (GSP) – providing they meet cer-
tain standards of good governance. The EU’s 2001 Everything but Arms initiative 
provides lesser developed countries (LDCs) with duty-free and quota-free access 
to the EU market. These trade concessions have seen a major increase in exports, 
especially textiles, to the EU market.
Although trade and development assistance has been the main EU footprint in 
Asia, the economic rise of Asia has brought with it political influence and respon-
sibility. Thus, the EU has sought to engage Asia in more global issues. Perhaps the 
best example is climate change, where the EU is regarded as the global leader. The 
EU invested heavily, and successfully, in securing Asian support for the Paris cli-
mate change agreement. The EU also recognises that Asia is vital in tackling region-
al security issues and transnational challenges, such as terrorism and pandemics. 
Trade and security are of course interlinked. Asia’s growth rests on continued 
regional stability. That is why the “Asian paradox” matters to non-Asians too (“Eco-
nomic Asia” represents integration and optimism, while “Security Asia” represents 
fragmentation and pessimism). It is clear that the existing regional security archi-
tecture is not yet robust enough to manage rising tensions and geopolitical competi-
tion. All countries are hedging in the face of uncertainty about the future presence 
of the US in the region and the ambitions of China. ASEAN is at the heart of emerg-
   4    GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 6 | NOVEMBER 2017 
ing regional cooperation frameworks and the best hope for a rules-based regional 
order. This is why the EU should intensify its efforts to bolster ASEAN’s capacity to 
deal with conflicts and crisis management. 
At the same time, the EU should also urge Japan, China, and South Korea to 
deepen regional cooperation in North East Asia, where the political use of historical 
issues continues to bedevil relations between the three countries. The EU’s experi-
ence of reconciliation after 1945 is highly relevant to the region, and it could better 
promote this in all three countries. The Asia–Europe Foundation (ASEF) might be 
one organisation that could do more in this area.
How the EU Engages with Asia
The EU engages with Asia in three ways. First, on the bilateral level the EU has four 
strategic partners in Asia (China, Japan, India, and Korea) plus a number of other 
important relationships with Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Australia, and New 
Zealand, inter alia.
The strategic partnerships have a similar structure to annual summits, min-
isterial meetings, and a plethora of dialogues. Most attention is focused on China, 
which has become increasingly active in all corners of the world, including as both 
an investor in Europe and a foreign policy player in regions and issues of impor-
tance to Europe. Before and after China joined the WTO in 2001, the EU saw itself 
as a mentor and hoped that as China moved towards a market economy the natural 
consequence would be greater democracy (European Commission 2006). This illu-
sion has gone, but the EU has struggled to find a consistent and coherent approach 
to China, whether dealing with trade issues (e.g. solar panels, screening of invest-
ments) or political issues (e.g. human rights, the Dalai Lama). The EU maintains its 
arms embargo imposed after Tiananmen Square and is engaged in a dispute about 
market economy status for China. Despite these problems, both sides are currently 
negotiating a bilateral investment treaty, which could be a precursor to an eventual 
FTA. But much will depend on the evolution of domestic policy in China, especially 
economic reform. Cooperation is more positive as regards global issues, with China 
and the EU working closely on climate change, migration, Iran, Syria, the DPRK, 
Afghanistan, and African peacekeeping (European Commission 2016). 
The EU is also about to finalise a strategic partnership agreement (SPA) and an 
economic partnership agreement (EPA) with Japan, which will be the biggest boost 
to global trade since China joined the WTO in 2001. It should lead to a much deeper 
relationship across the board as the political agreement allows for close cooperation 
on foreign and security policy. Prime Minister Abe views the EU as an important 
anchor of stability on global issues given the uncertainty and unpredictability from 
Washington.
South Korea is the only Asian country that has three comprehensive agreements 
with the EU, which cover trade, political, and security cooperation, respectively. All 
three are working well: bilateral trade has risen 30 per cent since the 2013 FTA was 
signed, there is extensive cooperation on innovation and technology, and there is 
growing cooperation on foreign policy, with Seoul even providing a helicopter ship 
to boost the EU’s Operation Atalanta. The partnership, however, is hardly visible in 
the eyes of the public.
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India has perhaps not received the attention it deserves from the EU. At the 
latest summit on 6 October 2017, the two sides issued a lengthy joint statement 
detailing progress on many areas of cooperation. Although there has been some 
progress on science and education, clean energy, and maritime security, the FTA 
negotiations remain blocked due to lack of agreement on market access. Moreover, 
the two sides have generally found it difficult to cooperate on global issues such as 
migration and terrorism. While India shares the EU’s focus on effective multilater-
alism, it has been less willing to support EU action in multilateral fora including the 
UN and the WTO. India’s problems internally and in its neighbourhood (Afghani-
stan, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar) have also reduced its capacity to 
play a truly global role. India has also shown little interest in promoting democracy 
or human rights and has often accused the EU of hypocrisy. The EU’s efforts to ad-
dress the causes of poverty in India – namely, child labour and caste and gender 
discrimination – have also proven to be sensitive (European Commission 2004). 
Second, the EU supports regional integration, with ASEAN being the clear pri-
ority (The South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation [SAARC] has never real-
ly taken off). An ambitious new action plan for 2018–2022 was agreed in Manila in 
August 2017 and now needs to be implemented (European Union 2017). Apart from 
extensive cooperation in several areas, including customs and trade, aviation, and 
the environment, the EU should strengthen ASEAN’s central role in building a more 
robust regional architecture. The EU has relevant experience in maritime security, 
border management, and conflict prevention. 
Third, it is a strong supporter of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) process, 
which brings together over 50 countries from the two continents for a biannual 
summit and an annual ministerial meeting. Established in 1996, ASEM has three 
pillars (political, economic, and sociocultural) and enables both sides to engage on 
a number of current issues without the presence of the US. But as with many in-
ternational gatherings, lots of leaders use them for convenient bilateral meetings. 
Civil society is also involved through a business forum, a peoples’ forum, and the 
Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF). The next summit will be held in Brussels in Oc-
tober 2018 and should provide an opportunity for Europe and Asia to deepen their 
cooperation and defend the multilateral system from attacks by Washington.
A Stronger Engagement with Asia
Given the growing importance of Asia, the EU has to deepen its engagement with 
Asia. First, however, the EU should put its own house in order. Asia’s view of Eu-
rope has not been improved by the EU’s poor economic record, the constant talk of 
secession (Brexit and Grexit), and its failure to deal with regional challenges such 
as migration. A strong, vibrant EU that can ensure growth, political stability, and a 
secure neighbourhood would do wonders for the EU’s image in Asia and elsewhere. 
At the same time, the EU should step up its public diplomacy efforts in Asia.
Second, the EU needs to engage in a more effective manner with Asia. Despite 
commitments under the Lisbon Treaty, not all member states support the EU as 
they should. The 16+1 arrangement, where China deals with several “new” EU 
member states and some Balkan countries, has brought little benefit to its members 
beyond an annual photo op with the Chinese prime minister. The July Foreign Af-
   6    GIGA FOCUS | ASIA | NO. 6 | NOVEMBER 2017 
fairs Council stated that any such ad hoc arrangements had to abide by EU rules and 
regulations. There is nothing wrong with member states promoting their bilateral 
relations with China, but on EU issues all member states have sufficient opportu-
nity to influence policy through the Council working groups and the Foreign Affairs 
Council. The larger member states, which all have extensive bilateral relations with 
China, have a special duty to ensure that the views of the smaller member states are 
taken into account. 
Apart from deepening relations with the four strategic partners, the EU should 
focus on a number of other priorities:
 • It should stay the course on Afghanistan and prevent the country slipping back 
into the hands of the Taliban, which would further increase the already large 
number of Afghan refugees coming to Europe. As noted in the EU’s strategy 
paper on Afghanistan in October 2017, the EU and its Asian partners have a 
shared interest in supporting Afghanistan’s reform and state-building process-
es. Billions of euros have been spent on bolstering Afghan security forces with 
little result to date. Working with Asian partners, including China and India, 
would greatly increase the chances of success in Afghanistan (European Coun-
cil 2017). 
 • The EU must help to ensure the success of democracy in Myanmar. The EU was 
an important partner during the transition from military rule, but Myanmar 
still faces huge problems, such as the need to reduce ethnic tensions (evidenced 
by the mass exodus of Rohingya Muslims to Bangladesh) and overhaul the edu-
cation system. The success of this transition will be important not only for the 
people of Myanmar but also for the wider ASEAN region, where democratic 
norms are under pressure. The EU needs to increase its assistance for the refu-
gees and also help oversee their return to Rakhine. If it does not, the appalling 
situation of the refugees in Bangladesh could become a fertile breeding ground 
for radical Islam forces. 
 • The EU has to improve its cooperation in multilateral fora with Asian partners. 
Too often, Asian partners come after the US, Canada, and other “like-minded 
countries” when discussing global issues. It should become automatic to work 
with Asian partners in the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, ad hoc bodies, and 
new institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). 
Sometimes, it may prove most useful to cooperate with ASEM or ASEAN; how-
ever, more often it will be more fruitful to work with individual Asian countries 
and strategic partners, amongst others.
 • It should continue to promote democracy and human rights, albeit in a more 
sensitive and consistent manner. The EU faces major challenges in dealing with 
human rights abuses, inter alia, in China, Cambodia, and the Philippines. Many 
Asians, however, feel that the EU tends to preach rather than engage in dia-
logue. Double standards is a charge often levelled at the EU by some Asians, 
while there is still a feeling of resentment in some quarters towards the former 
colonial masters. The US was previously a strong partner of the EU, but as the 
Trump administration has shown little interest in pursuing a normative agen-
da, the EU finds itself more exposed. But this should not hinder it from seeking 
to promote universal standards of human rights. This again requires a united 
EU voice. Regrettably, at the UN Human Rights Council in 2017 and in other 
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fora, not all EU member states were prepared to support statements criticising 
China’s human rights record.
 • The EU ought to promote its integrated approach towards security as it sup-
ports Asian understandings of dialogue and tolerance as well as Asian long-
term orientation culture. Traditionally, the US has been the main guarantor of 
security in the region, which remains true in terms of hard security. Although 
China spends billions on its military, the US remains far ahead in terms of mili-
tary capability. But as Afghanistan and Iraq have shown, military power alone 
does not ensure security. There is also uncertainty about the durability of US 
alliances, not least because of President Trump’s remarks. As Federica Mogher-
ini said, the EU may not be an Asian power, but it is an Asian partner. The EU 
should thus use its invitation to the East Asian Summit to discuss a possible re-
gional security model based on the Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe. Although this will not be achieved overnight, a neutral outside part-
ner like the EU could help to break the deep-rooted, historical mistrust in the 
region. In the absence of agreements on several sovereignty claims, notably in 
the South China Sea, the EU’s experience of legal frameworks and a bottom-up 
approach to confidence-building measures could be most valuable.
 • The EU must maintain its “critical engagement” policy towards the DPRK, ar-
guably the most acute security problem in the region. Tensions are extremely 
high due to the increasing pace of DPRK missile testing and the resulting war of 
words between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un. There are no official relations 
between the US and the DPRK and only very occasional unofficial contacts. 
The EU could thus play a greater role as it is clearly not regarded as a security 
threat by the DPRK. In recent years, however, EU policy has focused more on 
being critical than on engaging. Given the importance of maintaining channels 
to Pyongyang, the EU should increase its political contacts with the DPRK with-
out deviating from its support for UN sanctions. As there is no military solution 
for the DPRK situation, all diplomatic, economic, and political channels should 
be kept open.
 • It should use the 2018 ASEM summit in Brussels to strengthen support for 
the multilateral system, which is now under sustained attack from the White 
House. This need not be portrayed as “ganging up on the US” but rather as dem-
onstrating that the multilateral approach (which has served the US well since 
1945) brings more peace, stability, and prosperity to the world. Connectivity 
should be a main theme with both sides promoting initiatives (Belt and Road 
and the new Arctic Route) that bring the two continents closer. 
 • The EU ought to seek greater involvement of the Asian diaspora in Europe. 
There are large Asian communities in many EU member states, and some have 
assumed leadership positions in Portugal, Ireland, and the UK. But EU leaders 
rarely reach out to them or seek their support to develop closer ties with Asia. 
The Chinese in Italy, the Vietnamese in France, the Indonesians in the Nether-
lands, and the Indians and Pakistanis in the UK should be more involved in 
EU–Asia relations.
 • The EU must adopt a more modest and self-critical approach. Some Asians 
find the EU’s desire to help resolve disputes in their region as patronising and 
even hypocritical. As one former Indian foreign minister said, “when you have 
solved the Cyprus issue, the Catalan question, and agreed a name for Macedo-
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nia, then maybe we will listen to you on Kashmir.” Many EU leaders also show 
little under standing of the continued ill feeling caused by Europe’s colonial past 
despite the fact that the massacre of Amritsar and the Opium Wars are known 
to every schoolchild in India and China, respectively. 
 • It has to present a united front in Asia. There is limited, albeit slowly growing, 
media coverage of the EU in Asia. The EU is primarily reported as an economic 
actor and the euro is the strongest symbol of European identity. The EU as a 
political actor rarely gets a mention even when playing a key role in important 
negotiations, as was the case in the Iran nuclear negotiations. Member states 
should display more solidarity with EU policies and allow the EU ambassador 
to articulate EU positions to third-country hosts. This is already provided for 
under the Lisbon Treaty but is not always observed.
Conclusion
Although the EU has deepened its relations with Asia in the past 15 years, it has 
tended to do so in response to events and in an ad hoc manner. The sheer economic 
weight of Asia means that the EU should now be developing a new Asia strategy 
that takes into account the new geopolitical and geoeconomic environments. There 
are two important policy papers dealing with India and Europe-Asia connectivity 
planned for 2018. However, the different strands of EU policy – trade, development, 
technical assistance, the environment, energy, security, human rights – should be 
integrated into a comprehensive approach that allows for greater use of linkages in 
order to maximise the EU’s influence. A new overarching EU strategy towards Asia 
could be an indispensable instrument to enhance policy coherence, promote the 
image of the EU as a strategic player in the entire region, and ensure the EU’s own 
interests and expectations are clearly defined.
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